

Signals Passed at Danger (SPAD) and Exceeded Limit of Authority Management

RLS-PR-002

Applicability

ARTC Network Wide SMS

Publication Requirement

Internal Only

Primary Source

SP-03-12 SPAD Management

Document Status

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Amendment Record

Amendment Version #	Date Reviewed	Clause	Description of Amendment
1.1	18 June 2018	Whole document	This procedure updated to include amended ONRSR SPAD definition and reporting requirements.
1.2	26 Sept 2023	Various	Document owner change, division & role title update, terminology update to align H360
1.3	12 Jan 2024	2.4	Updated response requirement to align TTM standard practices.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this procedure is to provide a framework for the management of SPAD's which includes Exceeded Limit of Authority that occurs on the ARTC Network.

1.2 Scope

This procedure is applicable to all occurrences that have occurred on the ARTC rail corridor.

1.3 Procedure Owner

The General Manager Safety Systems, Risk and Assurance is the document owner and is the initial point of contact for all queries relating to this procedure.

1.4 Responsibilities

The Business Unit Operational General Managers are responsible for the identification and recording of SPADs, and the investigation and management of SPADs not caused by infrastructure failure, including liaison with rail traffic operators.

The Asset General Managers of the Business Units are responsible for the investigation and management of SPADs caused by infrastructure failure.

The Business Unit Operational General Managers is responsible for the reporting of SPADs to the rail safety regulatory authority.

1.5 Subordinate Documents

This document provides the framework and minimum standard that must be applied. Business Unit Safety and Environment teams may choose to provide further guidance or obligations within their defined jurisdiction. It is preferable that in the development of such documents that Corporate Safety be consulted. Such documents must be approved by the Business Unit Group Executive ahead of publication and implementation.

1.6 Reference Documents

The following documents support this procedure:

- Signal Engineering Standard SMP 04 – Failures
- Signal Engineering Standard SMP 43 – Guidelines for Irregularity Inspection and Testing to Determine Cause
- Code of Practice for the Defined Interstate Rail Network (Operations and Safeworking) Rule 3.15
- ARTC Addendum to the Code of Practice for ARTC Addendum to the Code of Practice for the Defined Interstate Rail Network, Section 28
- OPE-PR-012 Network Control Centre Operational Procedure
- RISSB SPAD Risk Management
- ARTC NSW Network Rules (NSW), ANSG 612

- ARTC Discipline Procedure PEO-PR-007

1.7 Definitions

The following terms and acronyms are used within this document:

Term or acronym	Description
SPAD / Authority Exceeded	Where rolling stock passes a stop indication including <ul style="list-style-type: none">• passes without authority a signal displaying a stop indication or a stop aspect including but not limited to fixed signals, stop boards, hand signals, or black or improperly displayed signals; or• exceeds the limits of authorised movements including in-cab indicators, paper-based and electronic “occupancy authorities” and encroachment on a protected worksite.
Track Vehicles	Meaning track machines and road rail vehicles

2 Response to a SPAD

The process for SPAD management is outlined in Appendix A.

2.1 Initial Report of a SPAD

On report of a SPAD the Network Controller must guard against any danger of collision with other rail traffic and/or road traffic.

The Network Controller shall then report the SPAD to the Train Transit Manager.

2.2 Infrastructure Fault

Where the cause of a SPAD is reported to be due to an infrastructure fault the Train Transit Manager will contact the relevant ARTC provisioning centre's Signals team to investigate. An investigation is to be carried out in accordance with Signal Engineering Standards.

2.3 Network Control Error

In the event of a Network Controller error the TTM will take immediate steps to assess the situation and determine if the Network Controller has had a safe working incident.

The incident will be investigated in accordance with the ARTC SMS.

The Interstate or Hunter Valley Manager Network Operations Managers will be responsible for the performance management (including arranging drug and alcohol testing) of the Network Controller following the outcome of the investigation and commensurate with ARTC Discipline Procedure PEO-PR-007.

2.4 Rail Traffic Crew Error (Operator)

Where the Train Transit Manager has confirmed a SPAD due to rail traffic crew error the Train Transit Manager must liaise with the Rail Operator. The Train Transit Manager must continue to engage with the Train Operator until such time as arrangements are agreed for the safe passage of the affected rail traffic crew.

Where it has been established that the SPAD was not caused by rail traffic crew error (such as a signal reverting to "STOP" in the face of the rail traffic) the movement will be permitted to proceed after obtaining the required Authority to do so. It must be assumed that there may be a track defect that has caused the signal to revert to stop.

Where it has been established that the SPAD was caused by rail traffic crew error the movement must be given the required Authority to move to a location where other movements may be able to cross or pass (if applicable). Once the movement has come to a stand the operator is to arrange for the train crew to be recertified / relieved.

2.5 Rail Traffic Crew Error (Track Vehicles – ARTC Operated)

In the event a track machine (include road rail vehicles) operated by an ARTC worker is involved in a SPAD the Network Controller will take immediate steps to assess the situation and ensure the safety of the Network. The Train Transit Manager will inform the applicable Business Unit Manager representative who will be responsible for performance management (including

arranging drug and alcohol testing) following the outcome of an investigation and commensurate with ARTC Discipline Procedure PEO-PR-007.

2.6 Maintenance Representative Error

In the event that a SPAD is identified as resulting from a breach by an ARTC worker the Train Transit Manager will notify the applicable Business Unit Manager who will be responsible for performance management (including arranging drug and alcohol testing) following the outcome of an investigation and commensurate with ARTC Discipline Procedure PEO-PR-007.

Where the maintenance representative is a contractor the applicable Business Unit Manager will further manage the incident with the contractor's employer including the possible suspension of the workers role(s) pending investigation.

Appendix 1

SPAD Investigation Process

