

Incident No.	INC-63190
Date of Incident	01 st February 2014
Division	Infrastructure/Rail
Business Unit	Eastern Region
Alert No.	006

Worker cut LV cable

SITE:	Epping to Thornleigh Third Track Alliance	
CLASSIFICATION:	ACTUAL DAMAGE: Nil	POTENTIAL DAMAGE: PC1
CONTACT DETAILS:	NAME: Michael Laing	POSITION: Safety Manager
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Incident Description

As part of the Station works at Pennant Hills a section of the station concourse had to be demolished. Due to the nature of the work and the close proximity of the trains, the work was planned to be completed during a weekend possession. The down track was under a Local Possession Authority (LPA) and the up track was protected by a series of Track Occupation Authority (TOA). The TOA's were utilised as a number of freight trains had to run in both directions at various times throughout the weekend.

Before any of the demolishing work commenced, all the services in the area were either diverted or disconnected to allow the demolition contractor to complete the work. A document was developed in conjunction with Sydney Trains on all the affected services. This was briefed to the electricians in order for them to disconnect the cables before demolition work commenced. As each cable was disconnected at the source the other end was tested to ensure the cable was dead. Once the electricians confirmed all the cables shown on the drawing were dead the demolition was allowed to commence which included cutting the cables.

During the possession an issue was raised regarding the telephones in the ticket office not working. Initial investigations could not determine the cause of the issue and a fault was raised to Sydney Trains. It was not known until the Monday that the cause of the fault was due to a live 240v cable being cut as part of the demolition works. The worker who had cut the cable did not receive a shock as a result of the incident.

Photograph showing the end of the cut cable



Preliminary Findings / Underlying Causes

Investigation of the incident is continuing. However, preliminary findings have identified the following contributing factors/deficiencies:

- There were no formal As-built drawings from Sydney Trains and the Detailed Site Survey (DSS) does not provide a lot of detail at station locations.
- The 240v cable was mislabelled on the drawing as a supply for the help points, whereas it supplied the vending machine. Following site visits and meetings with Sydney Trains, a document of photographs was developed to identify each cable and those that were required to be disconnected.
- No isolation permit was issued prior to demolition work commencing to confirm all isolations and disconnections were complete.

Reminder

Project Managers/Persons involved in planning/coordination/performing similar activities are reminded of the importance of the following controls:

- Ensure a systematic verification of services is agreed and completed prior to any works occurring especially where no As-Built or DSS/DBYD information is available. Where services have been de-energised proof of de-energisation (test for dead), including but not limited to lockout systems, earthing regimes, visible points of disconnection, explosive cable stabber must be undertaken.
- Ensure any service that needs to be tested, verified as dead or removed is only undertaken by the authorised and competent person (eg. electrician).

Actions:

- Review all demolition work or work around live services to ensure that systematic verification and proof of de-energisation has been conducted for each service and detailed in a valid Isolation Permit.
- Reinforce expectation, understanding and obligation of workers to follow safety instructions and safe systems of works (eg. SHEWMS, Isolation Permits, VOC etc) through project inductions, toolboxes and other methods of consultation. Each person will be held accountable for any deliberate non-compliance and disciplinary measures will be undertaken accordingly.

Document Information:

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